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**Ings Report
[Redacted]**

**Independent
Review
of Integrity
in Tennis**

APPENDIX

**Report on Corruption Allegations
In
Men's Professional Tennis**

June 21, 2005

**Richard Ings
Executive Vice President
Rules and Competition**

**ATP Tour Inc.
201 ATP Tour Blvd
Ponte Vedra Beach
Florida, 32082
USA**

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In conducting this inquiry and completing this report, appreciation is expressed to Lord Condon, Jeff Rees and their team at the Cricket Anti-Corruption and Security Unit (ACSU) for their valuable assistance and insights.

The ACSU, staffed by experienced former police officers and chaired by a former Commissioner of New Scotland Yard represents best practice in anti-corruption measures in international professional sports. The International Cricket Council (ICC) is to be applauded for the commitment they have shown to the fight against corruption.

In preparing this report, the 2001 *Report on Cricket Corruption* authored by Lord Condon was a ready reference. The similarities between the corruption threat to cricket and the corruption threat to tennis are unmistakable.

This report has therefore adopted wholeheartedly and without alteration sections of the Condon report. Corruption, whether it is in cricket, tennis or any sport has similar root causes and similar approaches are required to deal with the issue.

The ICC Conduct Commission in 2001 wrote the following reply in part on receiving the Condon report.

The report convinces us that however much we may regret the past and in some cases the difficulties of proving past corruptions, it is upon the present and the future we must concentrate and that every practical measure must be taken to break the links between cricketers and unlawful gambling and return to a game where every player gives of his best.

The past cannot be changed but our future we can directly influence. It is in that spirit that this report has been prepared and presented.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report is submitted to the CEO of ATP Tour Inc under the 2005 ATP Rules. This report provides details of inquiries conducted to date into allegations of corruption in men's professional tennis. The report further examines the history and causes of such alleged corruption and makes recommendations to minimise the risk of corruption.

2. The inquiry approached the task of examining allegations of corruption in men's professional tennis with an open mind, respect for individual players and their support teams and a compassion for the social and cultural differences that exist in men's professional tennis.

3. The inquiry thanks those courageous individuals that have been frank in their sharing of information about gambling and alleged corruption in men's professional tennis.

4. While this report has been written with the CEO and Board of ATP Tour Inc as the expected audience, the report has been drafted with the probability that it may be made public at some time. There is a clear and legitimate public interest in the subject matter of this report. Public confidence in men's professional tennis will only be maintained if there is open and frank analysis of the history of gambling and alleged corruption in the sport, a willingness to confront the challenges that threaten the integrity and reputation of the sport, and strong apolitical leadership to change the culture of deliberate player underperformance as accepted business.

5. As a report that may at sometime be made public, this document must not in any way prejudice any individuals or prejudice the outcomes of specific ongoing enquiries and legal proceedings into specific individuals. This report therefore does not release full details of ongoing investigations. The outcome of these individual investigations will be determined entirely on the merits of each case.

6. This report will act as an alarming wake up call for the sport of men's professional tennis and its governing bodies. It describes how the seeds of corruption in tennis were planted 20 years ago, how deliberate underperformance grew as a direct but inadvertent consequence of rule changes during the 1990's, how gambling has taken root in the men's game from 2000 onwards and how such gambling has lead to allegations of corruption.

7. Deliberate under-performance by players and the ensuing gambling and alleged corruption that results from such deliberate underperformance appear to pervade all levels of the men's professional game today.

8. This report will outline admissions by player and/or their support team members of involvement in or knowledge of:

- (i) Match fixing
- (ii) Gambling on men's professional tennis.
- (iii) Being offered financial inducements by gamblers to under perform.
- (iv) Cultivating friendships with professional tennis gamblers.

- (v) Providing professional tennis gamblers with player guest accreditations.

9. This report will additionally outline the links between gambling and men's professional tennis.

- (i) Professional gamblers posing as journalists to get media accreditations to assist in their gambling activities.
- (ii) Retired players now employed by gambling organisations posing as members of the tennis family to get accreditations to assist in their tennis gambling related activities.

10. The report details a series of interlinked recommendations to enable the ATP to confront corruption in men's tennis and put in place strong measures to minimize corruption in the future. These recommendations include measures focused on the 3 key anti-corruption areas of education, physical prevention and deterrence. Many of these recommendations have been implemented by other international professional sports to confront corruption and as such are universally viewed as the state of the art in terms of sports anti-corruption.

11. The recommendations provide a credible deterrent to would be corruptors and a framework to help secure the detection and punishment of those who threaten the future of the game.

12. Men's professional tennis is at a crossroads of credibility that can only be resolved with a resolute commitment from the players, their support teams and their elected leadership to eradicate corruption and corrupt individuals from the game.

SECTION A

WHAT IS CORRUPTION AND HOW DOES IT THREATEN TENNIS?

13. At the outset, it is important for a sport such as tennis, which has not considered itself corrupt, to understand what corruption is and how it can threaten the sport of tennis.

14. In its simplest dictionary definition¹, corruption is defined as follows:

*Lack of integrity or honesty (especially susceptibility to bribery);
Use of a position of trust for dishonest gain;
Destroying someone's honesty or loyalty;
Undermining moral integrity;
Inducement by improper means (as bribery) to violate duty.*

16. From a tennis context, at a minimum, corruption is any action by a player or their support team that seeks to derive a personal benefit through either deliberate underperformance or the use or distribution of inside information.

¹ Source: www.google.com

17. Deliberate underperformance by players is a form of corruption. Tournaments that put up prize money and the public that purchases tickets believe that all players will compete in every match to the best of their physical ability. When players enter matches with an *intention* to lose, a deception is committed on the tournaments and public.

18. When gambling on sport enters the equation, such deliberate underperformance can have even more serious consequences.

19. When a player decides to deliberately under perform, a market for that inside information is generated amongst gamblers. Gamblers aware of an *intention* by a player to deliberately under perform have access to an arbitrage betting opportunity in a manner similar to insider trading on the stock market. The result is a betting coup and windfall profits for the individuals in possession of that inside information.

20. Sporting history is full of examples of gambling related corruption with deliberate underperformance by athletes as the root cause. These examples not only include gamblers making arbitrage profits but the athletes themselves seeking to profit by their own underperformance.

21. What is less well understood is how otherwise honest athletes find themselves involved in corruption. How do otherwise honest athletes get involved in corrupt and in some cases illegal conduct?

22. The explanation lies with understanding the “*corruption cycle*” and the role of seducement, followed by threats and blackmail in corrupting individuals.

23. Lord Condon, in his 2001 *Cricket Corruption Report* explains the *corruption cycle* as follows:

The classic seduction of a player into corrupt behaviour followed a familiar route. The target for corruption was introduced to the corruptor by an innocent or conspiratorial third party. The corruptor sought a betting advantage through contact with the targeted player or umpire. The spectrum of outcomes from these relationships ranged from information about players, pitches, team selection and morale through to the securing of under- performance and the fixing of match results.

The corrupt approach was often subtle, ambiguous and patient. The relationship would sometimes start innocently with admiration of players being used as the reason for invitations to mix socially. Corruptors have masqueraded as journalists or other professionals to gain access to players. Gifts without obligation would follow and eventually the true motivation for the relationship would emerge. The corrupt approaches would be made and either embraced or rejected.

24. Once the relationship between corruptor and player is established, it is often sustained via threats of public disclosure or intimidation. Once on the corruptors hook, it is difficult for the athlete to cease performing corrupt activities thus perpetuating the corruption cycle.

25. The reason that athletes are prohibited in tennis and other sports from gambling, quite apart from the obvious concern about the use of inside information, is that such actions expose the athlete to potentially corrupting forces.

26. The best way to explain this process is by example. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

32. Tennis players that gamble on their sport or have relationships with bookmakers or who deliberately under perform expose themselves and their sport to the same types of corruption as the [REDACTED] example.

33. Corruption presents the greatest risk to sports where significant volume is wagered. The greater the liquidity of the betting markets on a sport, the greater the payoff from corrupt conduct.

HOW MUCH MONEY IS GAMBLED ON MEN’S PROFESSIONAL TENNIS?

34. In the space of a few years, growth in gambling on men’s professional tennis has been significant. Many bookmakers spoken to by this inquiry indicate that tennis is now their #3 turnover sport (after horse racing and football) and their fastest growing segment.

35. A review of the many sports betting websites indicates that tennis is placed prominently and advertised heavily. Live score services, which are a mainstay of gamblers, carry live tennis scores from tournaments all over the world. The interest in gambling on tennis is such that sports betting agencies carry odds across all Grand Slams, ATP and many Challenger events.

36. The scale of betting on men’s professional tennis can be best gauged by a review of turnover by Betfair in 2004.

37. Betfair provided the following details of 2004 monthly turnover on men's tennis in US\$:

Volume	Turnover
January*	██████████
February	██████████
March	██████████
April	██████████
May*	██████████
June*	██████████
July	██████████
August	██████████
September*	██████████
October	██████████
November	██████████
Total	██████████

* = Grand Slam Months

39. Betfair also provided a list of the 10 most heavily bet men's matches in 2004:

Event Name	Market	Tournament	Turnover
Henman v Philippouss.	Mens Singles / Fourth Round Matches	Wimbledon	██████████
Coria v Henman	Mens Championship / Semi Final Matches	French Open	██████████
Gaudio v Coria	Mens Championship / Final	French Open	██████████
Henman v Ancic	Mens Singles / Quarter Final Matches	Wimbledon	██████████
Federer v Hewitt	Mens Singles / The Final	US Open	██████████
Federer v Roddick	Mens Singles / The Final	Wimbledon	██████████
Kiefer v Henman	Mens / Fourth Round Matches	US Open	██████████
Federer v Henman	Mens Singles / Semi Final Matches	US Open	██████████
Safin v Agassi	Mens Singles / Semi Final Matches	Australian Open	██████████
Henman v R Hidalgo	Mens Singles / First Round Matches	Wimbledon	██████████

40. Betfair estimates that they currently hold a ██████ share of betting turnover on men's professional tennis worldwide. As such it is estimated that the total amount wagered on men's professional tennis annually is approximately ██████████ and growing.

41. With such significant sums being wagered, the risk to tennis of corruption is real and the need for measures to protect the sport from corruption urgent.

ENCOUNTERING A CLIMATE OF SILENCE AND APATHY.

42. At the outset, the report will describe in detail the pervasive climate of silence and apathy that the inquiry continues to confront in pursuing its work. While the inquiry received the total support of the CEO and open assistance from ATP tournaments, by contrast some players, their support teams and their elected representatives were not so forthcoming.

43. Within days of the inquiry starting it became clear that some players, their support personnel and their elected representatives had information about gambling and corruption within the game. However, the prevailing attitude of those players, their support staff and their elected representatives was not helpful.

44. It became apparent very early that some players, their support teams and elected representatives had failed to report either attempts to corrupt them or their suspicions about other people they believed to be corrupt.

45. Various excuses were provided for what amounted to a conspiracy of silence. Players did not want to inform on their fellow players and risk being ostracized in the locker room. Player elected representatives believed that their "role" included protecting the confidentiality of players.

46. Some people were apathetic and thought corruption would always be present, in some form or another, in men's professional tennis. Others believed that the ATP should have no role to play in anti-corruption and that such matters should be left to law enforcement.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.

47. This inquiry was concerned that the wall of silence extended beyond the rank and file player membership to some of the elected player leadership.

48. Some elected player leaders admitted to direct knowledge of gambling activities on men's professional tennis by others but then declined to disclose their knowledge of such conduct.

49. One player council representative stated for the record at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that he had been approached and offered a 50,000 Euro bribe to under perform during what subsequently was learned to be the [REDACTED] tournament. No information of this incident had previously been reported to the ATP.

50. One player Board representative stated for the record at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that *if* he was aware of gambling on tennis by players that he would feel "obligated as an elected representative of the players to not give that information (of player gambling) to the ATP".

51. One player Board representative stated for the record at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that he had knowledge of "failed attempts to offer 2 players bribes of 50,000 Euro each to throw matches". No information about these 2 incidents had previously been reported to the ATP.

52. Some players and their support personnel who are *persons of interest*² to this inquiry, have sought the support of elected player leaders. At times this inquiry has been placed in the uncomfortable position of being asked by player elected leaders, acting on behalf of *persons of interest*, to justify an avenue of investigation.

² *Person of interest*: Any person that may be able to assist the inquiry.

53. The 2005 mission statement of the ATP is as follows:

“To govern the international men’s professional tennis circuit at the highest level of integrity and professionalism while promoting, growing and increasing the popularity of the game to the benefit of player and tournament members.”

54. *If* elected player representatives and Board members hold a position of not reporting player gambling, do not disclose in a timely manner their knowledge of alleged bribery, and act on behalf of persons subject to anti-corruption inquiries then such a position makes no contribution to the mission statement of maintaining “*the highest level of integrity and professionalism of international men’s professional tennis*” and may in fact be fostering a culture conducive to corruption.

55. Protecting the game from alleged corruption requires resolute commitment and zero tolerance from players and their elected leadership. Some player members are not displaying these qualities, in the opinion of this inquiry, at this time.

SECTION B

BACKGROUND TO ANTI-CORRUPTION INQUIRIES

56. In this section, the report outlines how inquiries into corruption allegations commenced, relationships built to establish anti-corruption measures and leads into details of actual investigations resulting from that early groundwork.

57. The position of Administrator of Rules is a formal post under the ATP rules with responsibility for enforcing the ATP Rules. Richard Ings was appointed to the position in January 2001. In late 2002 allegations of corruption in international cricket surfaced and a review of the anti-corruption programs in place within men’s tennis was initiated.

58. In June 2003 the ATP initiated a meeting at Lords in London with the Chief Executive Officer of the International Cricket Council (Malcolm Speed). The purpose of the meeting was to learn about the scale and scope of corruption in cricket and to assess the vulnerability of men’s professional tennis to corruption.

59. The assessment of the vulnerability of men’s professional tennis to corruption indicated that tennis was no less vulnerable to corruption than cricket or any other sport that had also experienced corruption. It was noted that no security apparatus was in place, anti-corruption rules were over a decade old, and that no education of players on the issue occurred.

60. Critically it was noted that as an individual sport, tennis only required the involvement of a single player for corruption to be possible. If a sport could have been invented with the possibility of corruption in mind, that sport would be tennis.

61. It was further noted that men’s tennis had no understanding of how gambling on tennis occurs, who conducts it, what the volumes are or what information is available

from gambling operators on individual bets. The total knowledge of the sport on the issue of corruption was low and the defenses against corruption were lower. In fact it was noted that tennis had a series of ranking and prize money rules that offered the unscrupulous little disincentive to under perform.

62. In June 2003 a journalist³ approached the ATP with “*evidence*” of corruption in tennis. This “*evidence*” was information from leading bookmakers of *irregular betting*⁴ patterns and above normal trading volume on several 1st round men’s tennis matches.

63. Note that irregular betting patterns do not indicate that corruption has occurred but such patterns do warrant further investigation as to the causes of those irregular betting patterns.

64. To investigate the allegations from the journalist, the ATP initiated an approach to [REDACTED] Betfair. Betfair are the largest betting exchange and had recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to share betting account details with the UK Jockey Club.

65. In September 2003 the ATP entered into a MoU with Betfair and was provided with substantial information about unusual betting patterns on a number of men’s tennis matches. This information assisted greatly in understanding the mechanics of betting on men’s tennis and provided the catalyst for expanding inquiries into alleged corruption.

66. The ATP was the first professional sport to sign a MoU with Betfair. Since that time several other sports organizations including the FA, UEFA, ICC, and ITF have also signed MoU’s with Betfair.

67. Since signing the MoU with Betfair, the ATP has signed similar information sharing MoU’s with other legal gambling operators. These agreements give the ATP substantial information on tennis betting activities.

68. In September 2003 the ATP recruited a professional investigator to provide investigation expertise to the inquiry. The investigator has previous experience in sports corruption investigations having contracted to the Cricket Anti-Corruption and Security Unit. The investigator is former detective from New Scotland Yard.

69. In October 2003 the ATP investigator and EVP Rules met with the Chairman (Lord Condon) and General Manager (Jeff Rees) of the Cricket Anti-Corruption and Security Unit in London.

³ [REDACTED] approached ATP with his allegation of corruption occurring in tennis.

⁴ *Irregular betting pattern*: Bets placed on a match which when considered against the normal run of betting and the volume of such bets can be considered as unusual. For example when a punter wagers significantly more than his usual stake on a player to lose that is considered an irregular betting pattern.

78. As was the practice then established, the on-site ATP Supervisor was notified to watch the match carefully for underperformance. In addition the Supervisor was asked to consult with the ATP trainer to determine if there was any indication of injury. There was no indication of any injury. A video was also taken of the match for future reference.

79. [REDACTED] drifted substantially with high volume being bet on him to lose. The shift in odds was so great and so unusual [REDACTED] on the match. [REDACTED].

80. On [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] carried the following story:

[REDACTED]

93.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

101. This incident highlighted the dangers to tennis of betting by members of the tennis family and the shortcomings of the 2003 ATP rules to deal with such situations. For example the inability under the 2003 ATP rules to request financial and telephone records made it impossible to independently verify the players defense of no knowledge of the bets being placed on their credit cards.

102. This incident was the catalyst for a major re-write of the ATP rules to better deal with such situations in the future.

103. This incident was the first major use of betting account information from Betfair. The ATP had unparalleled insight into this matter as a result of the Betfair MoU. In fact without the Betfair MoU the ATP would have been unable to investigate this matter as thoroughly as it did.

POSTSCRIPT TO [REDACTED] VS [REDACTED]

104. Following the [REDACTED] match between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] several stories were published where players made statements outlining their alleged knowledge of gambling, bribery and match fixing in men's tennis.

[REDACTED]

105. On [REDACTED] 2003, [REDACTED] carried a prominent story that translates as follows:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

106. [REDACTED] was interviewed by this inquiry and asked to expand on and explain the statements attributed to him. [REDACTED] confirmed that he had given an interview with [REDACTED] where he discussed bribery and match fixing in men's professional tennis. [REDACTED] confirmed that the statements in the article were accurate but were "*hypothetical examples of how corruption could happen*" and not actual cases of corruption. [REDACTED] denied that [REDACTED] who he names in the interview, had ever offered him a bribe. [REDACTED] admitted that he had contacted [REDACTED] to inform him that he would be withdrawing with injury but denied that he solicited a bribe from [REDACTED] to withdraw from an ATP challenger event in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] again said his comments were a "*hypothetical example*" of how manipulation could occur with withdrawals.

107. [REDACTED] was also interviewed and indicated that he had never offered any bribe to [REDACTED] to fix a match during the 2003 [REDACTED] qualifying. [REDACTED] was also interviewed and admitted that [REDACTED] had called him to say that he ([REDACTED]) was withdrawing with injury and that he should sign in as a lucky loser. [REDACTED] who is a close friend of [REDACTED]'s, denied that [REDACTED] had solicited any payment for his withdrawal.

108. Legal counsel for [REDACTED] who agreed to speak to this inquiry, confirmed that they had transcripts of the interview given by [REDACTED] and that the article was in their opinion an accurate representation of what [REDACTED] had said. The paper's legal counsel pointed out that as the allegations were serious, the paper "*received confirmation from [REDACTED] on the accuracy of his comments*" and only on receiving such confirmation from [REDACTED] did they go to print.

109. On [REDACTED] 2003, [REDACTED] published a letter from [REDACTED] and issued an editorial response which is interpreted as follows:

[REDACTED]

players about to start final round qualifying matches that day that knew they were in the main draw win or lose.

119. One player assured of a main draw position that day was ██████ who was scheduled to play ██████. It is troubling to this inquiry that the “*hypothetical example*” cited by ██████ involved a match where the opportunity for such corruption was real.

120. Another player assured of a main draw position that day was REDACTED A who was scheduled to play REDACTED B. This inquiry has received statements⁸ that allege that REDACTED A, encouraged by other players in the locker room, approached REDACTED B with a proposal to arrange the outcome of this match in exchange for REDACTED A’s first round prize money. REDACTED B allegedly rebuffed the arrangement.

121. REDACTED A and REDACTED B were interviewed by this inquiry and both denied that any bribe had been offered by REDACTED A. This inquiry was unable to substantiate the statements alleging an attempted bribe.

122. Interviews with players who wished to remain anonymous indicated that it has been known for opposing players to discuss arranging a final round qualifying result when advancement to the main draw through the lucky loser system is known in advance. The alleged nature of such discussions is for the Lucky Loser to deliberately under perform, thereby assuring both players of a progression to the main draw, in exchange for the qualifiers first round prize money.

123. This investigation also examined allegations that lucky losers have approached main draw players with offers of bribes to secure a withdrawal and open up a guaranteed place in the main draw. Such information related to Challengers events where computer-ranking points have a higher value for up and coming players. This investigation noted the opportunity for such corruption to occur and examined incidents where such corruption was alleged but could find no evidence to support a violation of the ATP rules.

124. These situations highlight how the current Lucky Loser system is openly susceptible to corruption. Even if such corruption has not occurred, it is clear that players and their support teams are aware of and openly discuss the opportunity for manipulation of the current Lucky Loser system. The fact that ██████ raised such a detailed example ██████ is evidence enough that such manipulation is contemplated by elements of the player membership.

125. A recommendation of this report will be changes to the Lucky Loser system to remove the certainty of qualification unless a player wins his final round qualifying match.

⁸ Hear say statement of REDACTED A associate.

[REDACTED]

126. On [REDACTED] 2003 the following article appeared in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



127. [REDACTED] was interviewed for this inquiry. He maintained that he was aware of players, coaches and support team members that were gambling on men's professional tennis. [REDACTED] explained that gambling by players, coaches and support team members was a "common" practice in the locker room.

128. When pressed to name names, [REDACTED] refused to provide additional information saying that he could not "rat" out his fellow players. This is a direct example of the conspiracy of silence that this inquiry confronted on a daily basis from players and their support teams on this issue.

REDACTED E

129. Further investigations into the statement of [REDACTED] lead the investigation to speak to REDACTED E. The inquiry had eyewitness statements that REDACTED E, who at various stages has been a professional player, and a coach, had involvement in gambling on men's professional tennis.

130. When directly questioned about his involvement in gambling on men's professional tennis, REDACTED E initially issued a denial. When confronted with the witness statements possessed by the inquiry, REDACTED E admitted to his involvement in gambling on men's professional tennis.

131. REDACTED E admitted for the record that he placed bets on [REDACTED] to beat [REDACTED] at the 2003 Wimbledon Championships while he was coaching REDACTED F competing at the same event.

132. REDACTED E further indicated to the inquiry that the placing of bets on men's tennis matches by players, coaches and their support team members was "common" especially at the Grand Slam tournaments. He explained that his "small bets" were "harmless" even though he understood that such bets were a serious violation of the wagering rules of men's tennis.

133. REDACTED E refused to name names of other players; coaches and support team members that he was aware were also involved in gambling on men's professional tennis further.

134. While the conduct of REDACTED E is troubling, it was not in violation of the 2003 ATP Rules. The bets REDACTED E admitted to placing were at a Grand Slam tournament and the 2003 ATP Rules do not prohibit such bets. It is however noted that the REDACTED E's bets were a violation of the 2003 ITF Rules.

135. The REDACTED E incident was further evidence of the shortcomings of the 2003 ATP rules and demonstrated a troubling widespread cultural acceptance of gambling on men's professional tennis by male players and their support team members.

GAMBLING INDUSTRY SEEKS ACCESS TO ATP EVENTS

136. Early in the inquiry, the ATP received information that persons either employed by the gambling industry or with a heavy interest in gambling were gaining credentials to enter the player lounge area of ATP tournaments.

137. The initial information received by this inquiry related to persons related to gambling gaining access to tournaments by posing as journalists.

138. Following further inquiries the troublesome fact emerged that some persons related to gambling were gaining access to tournaments as the guest of competing players.

139. It has been well established that gambling interests accessing player areas at tournaments is an invitation to corrupt conduct⁹. The purpose of such gambling interests being at the tournament is to gain inside information from competing players to either assist in setting odds or to identify arbitrage-betting opportunities.

140. Such access invites relationships between gamblers and players that can lead to corruption.

141. In the course of inquiries, this investigation confirmed that persons related to gambling were gaining access to ATP tournaments by posing as journalists AND as invited guests of competing players. These persons related to gambling were also staying at official player hotels.

142. 3 individuals working as tennis analysts for well-known bookmakers have to date been identified as using guest badges supplied by competing players or their coaches to access the player lounge area of tournaments. All 3 individuals were barred from further entry to credentialed areas.

143. A 4th individual, who was confirmed as the tennis analyst for a well-known subscription tennis tipping website, was identified as using media credentials to gain access to the player lounge of tournaments. This individual was also barred from further entry to credentialed areas.

144. This inquiry noted that 3 of these individuals used deception to gain entry to tournaments. One used media credentials when not a member of the media. Another played on his role as a former player "*visiting town on holidays*" to gain an accreditation when his real purpose was fulfilling duties to his gambling industry employer.

145. It was troubling to this inquiry to note that 2 of the individuals were former players now working in the gambling industry as betting analysts. That the gambling industry

⁹ Lord Condon Report 2001 Corruption in Cricket

would employ former players with established relationships with players and coaches is not surprising but it represents an additional security risk for the sport.

146. This inquiry interviewed the players and coaches that supplied gambling industry persons with player guest credentials. In most cases the players and their coaches were unaware of the links between the persons and gambling and were shocked to learn of such links. The players and coaches were simply helping out "*friends of friends*" with a badge.

147. In cases where the player or coach was aware that the person was related to the gambling industry, such matters are subject to ongoing inquiries.

148. In the course of this inquiry, it became apparent that potential corruptors could mix freely with players, coaches and their support teams in the tournament player lounge, hotels and other locations. With no background checks in place at many ATP tournaments and with standards of accreditation record keeping lax, potential corruptors continue to have little difficulty in gaining access to players.

149. Apart from the risk of corruption, in this period of heightened threats, such lax security standards represent an unacceptable risk to professional athletes and professional events.

150. A key recommendation of this report is to implement tighter credential systems, record keeping and security standards at ATP event. These recommendations will include restricting locker room access to competing players and ATP trainers only in an effort to stem the flow of inside information on injuries emanating from the locker room.

IRREGULAR BETTING AT CHALLENGERS

151. The focus of the inquiry through 2003 was on irregular betting occurring at ATP tournaments. While most of the liquidity in tennis betting occurs at ATP and Grand Slam events, the explosion in growth in tennis betting in 2003 and 2004 saw numerous bookmakers posting odds for Challenger events.

152. The 2004 Tennis Masters Cup represents the official end of the ATP season. While no ATP tournaments are scheduled following this event, a series of ATP challenger (second tier) events are scheduled at various locations around the world. Where there are tennis events, a market for gambling on tennis follows.

153. While several matches played at Challenger events in the 2004 off-season displayed irregular betting patterns, the report will highlight one match as an example of this growing area of concern.

154. This inquiry has no evidence that would support a violation of the 2004 ATP rules in regard to this match. However this remains a match of interest and inquiries continue.

REDACTED C versus *REDACTED D* (ATP Challenger REDACTED)

155. The ATP Challenger event REDACTED offers a total of US\$25,000 in prize money to the players competing. The total prize money breakdown for players by round in singles and doubles in USD is as follows:

Round	Singles	Doubles
First Round	REDACTED	REDACTED
Second Round	REDACTED	REDACTED
Third Round	REDACTED	REDACTED
Fourth Round	REDACTED	REDACTED
Quarterfinals	REDACTED	REDACTED
Semifinals	REDACTED	REDACTED
Final	REDACTED	REDACTED

156. According to betting account information provided by Betfair pursuant to the MoU, REDACTED on this REDACTED match REDACTED.

157. According to betting account information provided by Betfair, the irregular volume on this match was driven by REDACTED.

158. REDACTED C was initially trading at approximately REDACTED but the odds drifted REDACTED with the influx of heavy betting by REDACTED on REDACTED C to lose.

159. REDACTED placed bets totaling REDACTED on various combinations of REDACTED D to win. The scale of bets placed and the method of placing them were inconsistent with the betting history of this account.

160. REDACTED is a heavy gambler on tennis having wagered REDACTED on Betfair alone in 2004. This accounts biggest win of the year was successfully wagering on this match.

161. It is troubling to this investigation that REDACTED, which is based in same country as REDACTED C (with the bets placed on this match originating from an REDACTED) had the confidence to wager larger than usual sums on a player to lose an obscure challenger match REDACTED.

162. Given that the match was uncovered by any major print or electronic media questions remain as to what information REDACTED possessed and how he possessed it to motivate such a wager from a location on the other side of the globe.

163. Of further concern to this inquiry is the prize money on offer at this event versus the total amounts being wagered. In this example the REDACTED. By

successfully selecting the match outcome, [REDACTED] had winnings of approximately USD\$15,000.

164. The low level of prize money at Challenger events relative to the significant profits that can be gained through deliberate underperformance presents a significant integrity threat to tennis.

165. The explosive growth in gambling and the vast sums available through bets dwarfs the prize money available at some ATP events and all challenger events. It is noted that the minimum prize money level at challengers has remained unchanged since the mid 1980's. Prize money reform to reduce the attractiveness of deliberate underperformance forms part of the inquiries recommendations.

[REDACTED]

166. On [REDACTED] 2005, [REDACTED] alleging corruption in men's professional tennis.

167. The transcript of the [REDACTED] was interpreted as follows:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

168. This report included an aired admission by a German-speaking player of his direct involvement in match fixing and bribery. This inquiry is actively trying to identify this player however once again assistance from players and their support teams who may be in a position to assist has been underwhelming. One coach told this inquiry, *“I have a good idea who the player is but I can’t share that with you ...”*.

169. Apart from the obvious concern that an ATP player has admitted to his involvement in match fixing and bribery at ATP tournaments, this broadcast was consistent with other information received by this inquiry of the methods and motivations for corruption in tennis. This interview appears to have a basis in reasonably expected fact.

[REDACTED]

170. In [REDACTED] 2005 the ATP learned through the media of the following wire story:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

171. On being questioned by this inquiry [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] was an “*acquaintance*” of his and that he ([REDACTED]) did speak with [REDACTED] briefly before the match but denied any wrongdoing.

172. The attention of this inquiry turned to [REDACTED] who at that time was unknown to the ATP. Betting account records obtained from Betfair and other agencies by this inquiry documented that [REDACTED] had a significant gambling interest in men’s professional tennis.

171. In 2004 [REDACTED] placed bets totaling [REDACTED] on professional tennis through Betfair. By any objective measure this is significant volume for an individual to wager through one betting agency and Betfair is just one of several agencies used by this individual to place bets.

172. Information received by this inquiry indicates that while [REDACTED] may have been unknown to the ATP, he is far from unknown to some professional players.

173. ██████ released a statement that ██████ was an “██████” of his. This inquiry has learned that ██████ is well known to some German, Austrian and Eastern European players around European tournaments by the nickname “██████”.

174. ██████ is also well known to some player support personnel. One prominent coach informed me that during a tournament he received promotional cigarette lighters advertising the sports betting agency www.admiral.at as a gift from ██████. One tournament assistant told the inquiry that ██████ has forwarded gifts of flowers to tournament staff as a thank you for credentialing assistance.

175. It was learned that ██████ received an accreditation to attend several ATP tournaments including but not limited to ██████. The credential he received to attend these events were player’s guest badges supplied by competing players REDACTED E and REDACTED F. ██████ stayed at the official player hotel in Paris Bercy.

176. ██████ appears as a principal punter in several matches that displayed irregular betting patterns. In addition to the bets ██████ placed on ██████ to lose in ██████ in 2004, he placed large bets on ██████ to lose a further 4 first-round matches including the match versus ██████ at 2004 ██████ versus ██████ at 2003 ██████ versus ██████ at 2003 ██████ and versus ██████ at the 2003 ██████ Challenger.

177. ██████ only places bets on ██████ to lose¹⁰ and has a 100%¹¹ win record making such bets. The bets by ██████ who ██████ admits is an *acquaintance* of his, are the driver of irregular betting patterns surrounding matches in which ██████ is a competitor.

178. ██████ has profited in the amount of ██████¹² by successfully placing bets on ██████ to lose. It is noted that ██████ and ██████ both reside in ██████

179. The matter of the ██████ bets is before the Austrian courts and it is hoped that those proceedings will offer some insight into ██████’s activities in men’s professional tennis and the nature of his relationship with ██████ and other ATP players and support team members.

180. In the meantime it is troubling to this inquiry that a known gambler such as ██████ has been able to gain near open access to ATP tournaments as the credentialed guest of players competing at those events and then places irregular bets on those same players to lose. This issue is subject to further investigation by this inquiry.

¹⁰ According to betting records supplied by Betfair.

¹¹ According to betting records supplied by Betfair

¹² According to bets placed with Betfair

ONGOING INQUIRIES

181. This inquiry is receiving information about irregular betting practices on ATP matches on a near weekly basis. All such reports are subject to investigation using all means available to this inquiry.

182. The inquiry is currently examining unusual betting patterns surrounding approximately 30 1st round men's professional tennis matches including matches played at Grand Slams, ATP events and ATP Challengers.

183. [REDACTED]. To date this inquiry has not determined that any individual competing or associated with any of these matches has violated any ATP rules.

SECTION D

ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN TENNIS

184. Corruption in any aspect of life is caused by human weakness, greed and opportunity. This section of the report will provide an analysis of when and how corruption may have developed in tennis.

185. The chronology of incidents in Section C of this report outline incidents that lead to justifiable concern about corruption in men's professional tennis. The picture that emerges from this chronology and in the course of ongoing inquiries is a discouraging one for genuine lovers of the men's professional tennis.

THE SEEDS OF CORRUPTION: DELIBERATE UNDERPERFORMANCE

186. Deliberate underperformance by male professional tennis players has been present in tennis for over 20 years. It is so common in fact that players have a euphemism for it in the well-known term "*tanking*".

187. Through the 80's and 90's, tanking took the form of players deliberately underperforming in order to conclude their obligations to a tournament. Perhaps the player was tired and wanted to take a week off. Perhaps the player had an exhibition to attend which offered superior rewards than the tournament. Or perhaps the player sought only to collect a guarantee for competing and had no interest in serious competition.

188. Whatever the individual's reason, tanking was and is relatively common in men's professional tennis. This inquiry has heard from players that have admitted to losing in scheduled pre-planned rounds of singles and doubles for personal reasons.

189. Actual observed cases exist of players turning up to compete with their bags packed and cars waiting to speed them to the airport at the matches conclusion.

190. While the sport of tennis has rules about "*Best Efforts*", such is the subtlety of tennis that detecting deliberate underperformance is difficult.

191. The ease with which players can deliberately under perform and not be detected is best explained by the words of [REDACTED] player [REDACTED] (ranked [REDACTED]) in his interview with [REDACTED]

192. The *Best Efforts* rules realistically serve to protect tennis from tanking that would draw the ire of the paying spectators. The rule is not designed nor is it capable of protecting tennis from subtle underperformance as explained above by [REDACTED]

193. There is some evidence to suggest these 'friendly' fixes took place during the 80's and 90's. Friendly fixes are defined as an agreement where winning or losing on merit was replaced by a pragmatic arrangement to agree in advance who would win. It is difficult to ascertain if such arrangements were the precursor to corruption for financial gain.

194. It is believed that the incidence of underperformance increased with rule changes to the ranking system in the early 1990's. The ranking system at one time was based on performance in every match. Any early round failure to perform resulted in a negative impact on a players ranking. Such a ranking system was a positive inducement on players to perform.

195. In the early 1990's the ATP changed the ranking system to be based on an average of a *Best Of* system. Basically only the best X tournament performances counted towards the ranking. Performance or underperformance in other tournaments had no impact on a players ranking.

196. An inadvertent and unplanned consequence of the move to a *Best Of* system was to remove ranking penalties for players that under perform in early rounds. While it is true that players that lose in early rounds earn less prize money than players that win, we will see that in certain circumstances at certain tournaments, even this difference in prize money is insufficient to dissuade players from deliberately underperforming

THE POTENTIAL EMERGENCE OF MATCH FIXING

197. With the explosion of gambling on men's professional tennis in the early 2000's, the opportunity for financial gain from deliberate underperformance developed.

198. As explained by the German player that appeared anonymously on the [REDACTED] 2005 [REDACTED] broadcast and as corroborated by interviews with players as part of this inquiry, corruption and match fixing in tennis can occur as follows.

199. A player is entered into a tournament in which he has little motivation to compete. Perhaps he is tired after playing several tournaments. Perhaps he has a well-paid exhibition scheduled for later in the week that he wishes to rest for. Perhaps the player is

carrying a small injury that he would prefer to rest. The reasons are many but the result is the same. The player enters the match with an intention to lose.

200. Why wouldn't the player not desiring to compete simply withdraw? In an effort to mandate commitment from players to tournaments, the ATP rules provide for significant financial penalties to withdraw. The closer to the tournament start date that the player withdraws, the larger the fine. Rather than incur a financial penalty, the player avoids the fine by simply taking to the court all be it with an intention to lose.

201. To avoid being fined for *Best Efforts*, the player must compete to a degree but lose a few key points at necessary moments to engineer the desired outcome.

202. The player can financially profit in any number of ways. Firstly he obtains prize money that he would not have obtained if he had pulled out. He obtains a free hotel room for the remainder of the week as a main draw competitor. He also avoids a fine for a withdrawal.

203. If unscrupulous the player can also lodge a bet on himself to lose profiting from the known outcome or solicit a bribe from his opponent in exchange for deliberately losing.

204. Finally the player can seek a "release" from the ATP following his loss to compete in a possibly lucrative Special Event that same week. During the 2004 7-week Bundesliga season, a total of 177 such releases were granted to players that had competed and lost at an ATP or ATP Challenger event. It is estimated that over 250 releases are granted each year.

205. In conclusion the player can profit significantly for a single days "*work*" versus incurring the alternative financial loss that would result from a withdrawal.

206. The opportunities for the unscrupulous to manipulate the tennis system to their own financial benefit are significant.

WHY CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED IN TENNIS?

207. In the course of this inquiry, players and their support teams that were prepared to speak on the issue have outlined why they think that a culture of gambling and corruption has developed in men's professional tennis. Whilst the explanations and excuses have varied in emphasis they embrace some or all of the following:

- Lower ranked tennis players and their support personnel are unable to earn a living wage from the game. Gambling using inside information is used as a means to supplement low-income levels.
- Tennis players and their support personnel have relatively short and uncertain careers, often without contracts and some seek to supplement their official earnings with money from gambling or corruption.

- Tennis players compete in many matches each year where “*nothing is at stake*” in terms of ranking or pride.
- Players and their support teams indicate that gambling on men’s tennis is “*common practice*” in the locker room. There is a culture of acceptance with even the player leadership turning a blind eye to such conduct.
- Whistle blowing and informing on malpractice would result in players being ostracized in the locker room. Remaining silent in the face of gambling or corruption by player peers was encouraged.
- There is no education on the issue of gambling and corruption for players. Players were just not aware of it being a serious threat issue to tennis. “*It is just a harmless bet*”.
- There is no structure in place to receive confidential allegations about corruption.
- It was just too easy.

208. None of these explanations and excuses, even if true, can ever begin to justify the betrayal of the game of tennis or the damage caused by the impact of gambling or corruption. However, these explanations need to be examined if effective systems of prevention and detection of corruption are to be implemented.

209. Variations in earning potential may play a role in seducing players and their support personnel into gambling and corruption. However in other sports even relatively well-paid athletes have been seduced into gambling and/or corrupt conduct while relatively low paid athletes and their support personnel have resisted.

210. Greed and opportunity are the main factors that are common in all the cases of corruption.

211. The environment in which gambling and alleged corruption has developed in men’s professional tennis must also be considered in developing barriers to such misconduct.

212. The report has already described the prevailing climate of silence, and apathy that exists amongst some player members, their support personnel, some of their elected representatives on this issue. Such a climate creates a player culture that is not conducive to dealing with the problem. Players did not want to inform on each other and there was no system to receive or process reports of improper approaches or behaviour. This environment was aggravated in many cases by an absence of security or control.

213. Until recently, security in the broadest sense was not on the agenda. Consequently, access to players for corrupt purposes at hotels, tournaments, and even locker rooms was near effortless. The unrestricted mixing of players, support personnel, journalists and others at many of these venues, whilst understandable, provided an ideal opportunity for corrupt approaches and meetings.

214. The nature of the match or tournament appears to be an important factor in determining the willingness or reluctance of some players and their support personnel to engage in deliberate underperformance, gambling and/or corruption.

215. If no ranking penalty exists and there were financial penalties for withdrawing then such matches would appear more susceptible to deliberate underperformance.

TOURNAMENTS AND MATCHES OF GREATER VULNERABILITY

216. During the course of inquiries, by players and their support team members believed to be knowledgeable of such activities have suggested that corruptors are more likely to target some matches at some tournaments more than others.

- Matches where no ranking impact is at stake and where the player would receive a fine if he withdrew.
- 1st round matches. The investigation has noted that rarely if ever do non-1st round matches attract irregular betting patterns.
- Matches in ATP tournament week held the week of Special Events (i.e. Bundesliga tennis) where the player has a commitment to play in both events.
- Matches where mutual advantage can result from a pre-arranged outcome. For example final round of qualifying when a lucky loser spot is already available in the main draw.

217. The most important factor driving the threat of corruption in men's professional tennis is the liquidity of the betting market and the opportunity to capitalize on that liquidity through inside information on player intentions to under perform.

THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM

218. What is clear to this inquiry from the many statements received by players and their support teams is that gambling by players and their support teams on men's tennis is "*common place*". What is also clear to this inquiry is that players do engage in deliberate underperformance. Finally what is clear to this inquiry is that persons with an interest in gambling are attempting to gain inside knowledge of such player intentions with an aim to making windfall-betting profits.

219. While the threat to the sport is clear, the scale of the corruption problem is harder to quantify at this time. The inquiry is following the activities of several persons of interest that account for the majority of bets placed causing irregular betting patterns. Inquiries continue as to what if any links such persons may have with individual tennis players and their support personnel.

220. While the scale of the problem is harder to quantify, the repercussions for the game of the suspicions and innuendo about corruption are unmistakable. Men's professional

tennis is currently stained by allegations of gambling and corrupt conduct by some of its player members and their support teams. Because of the often-secretive nature of the corrupt arrangement we may never know the full extent of corruption in tennis.

221. However, we do now have a much clearer idea of how, when and where corruption could take place and this gives me the confidence to outline recommendations for reform.

222. The measures needed to protect tennis from gambling and corruption require a “*One Game*” approach. Potential corruptors do not distinguish between ATP tournaments and those of other tennis governing bodies. Every tournament represents an opportunity for corruption and corruption at non-ATP events threaten the integrity of ATP tennis.

223. However what is clear is that the prevailing threat to the game is as a result of the conduct of some players, their acceptance of deliberate underperformance as business as usual and their willingness to turn a blind eye to malpractice by their peers.

224. A resolute public commitment by players and their leadership to confront the issues of gambling and corruption and their underlying causes is the foundation of any attempt at reform.

HOW HAS THE ATP RESPONDED TO CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS?

225. The ATP under the leadership of its CEO has demonstrated to this inquiry by its words and actions unmitigated support of anti-corruption measures. Management time has been focused and adequate resources provided to understand and investigate the allegations.

225. As it became apparent that the ATP Rules were ill suited to deal with the corruption threat of today, support was given to the design and introduction of a comprehensive Anti-Corruption Program. That Program, which was enacted as a rule from January 2005, provides best practice measures to detect, investigate and punish acts of corruption by members of the tennis family.

226. The ATP and the ATP Board should be applauded for their generally proactive response to the threat of corruption in tennis.

227. Of concern to this inquiry was a decision by the Player Leadership to not accept a recommendation to impose a positive obligation on players and their support teams to report suspicions of corruption to the ATP.

228. The climate of silence amongst players and their support teams only acts to protect those that are engaged in malpractice and in so doing may inadvertently be fostering the very misconduct that most agree should be rid from our game.

229. The idea of players reporting on their peers has been viewed reluctantly by the player membership. Other sports have confronted and dealt with this exact same issue. The Cricket Conduct Commission response to the Condon Report explains the concerns and responses best.

Recommendation 4 (of the Condon Report) refers to encouraging the reporting of improper approaches. Nobody likes the idea of having to tell tales about his colleagues but stern measures are necessary to stamp out corruption and we repeat the advice we have already given in an earlier report that there should be an obligation on a player to report any corrupt approach to another player of which he becomes aware.

230. This report will include a recommendation to introduce a positive obligation on players and their support teams to report suspicions of corruption to the ATP.

THE ROLE OF THE ATP BOARD

231. While in general the ATP Board has played a supporting role in the fight against corruption in tennis, to conclude this section the report will comment on the critical leadership that the ATP Board must provide in the fight against corruption as well as diplomatically identifying areas that the Board should reflect on.

232. This inquiry is troubled that Player Council members and player Board representatives failed in a timely manner to report suspicions of gambling or corruption by players or other persons to the ATP. Those persons in possession of those suspicions *should have* done more to deal with the threat of corruption at an earlier stage.

233. It is important to examine why those who have player leadership positions in tennis declined to come forward with their suspicions.

234. It would be easy for the cynical to suggest that a conflict of interest exists between the role of an elected player leader and the obligation for maintaining the integrity of the game. This inquiry does not agree with that suggestion.

235. However this inquiry does believe that individuals in positions of player leadership do not have the benefit of a “*Code of Directors*” outlining their obligations. Without proper guidance as to what is expected from them, their perceived *role* as player leaders may conflict with their *obligations* to protect the integrity of the game for the majority of players and their tournament partners.

236. The issue is resolvable by the establishment of an enforceable “*Code for Directors*” for members of the ATP Board.

SECTION E**RECOMMENDATIONS**

237. This section of the report outlines a number of recommendations that, if implemented, will give the ATP a much stronger ability to deal with the real threat of gambling and corruption.

EDUCATION AND AWARENESS

238. Ignorance of the risk and reality of gambling and corruption in men's professional tennis has contributed to the problem. The inquiry has spoken to seemingly educated individuals who had no idea that gambling could result in corruption in tennis. Ongoing mandatory education of members of the tennis family of the risks and reality of gambling and corruption is an urgent requirement.

RECOMMENDATION NO 1

239. The ATP should develop and implement a detailed training and awareness program focused on increasing the understanding of the risks of gambling and corruption to tennis and detailing the methods used by corruptors to ply their trade. It should also emphasise an apolitical resolve on the part of the ATP and its members to confront the threat of corruption and punish those that breach corruption rules.

RECOMMENDATION NO 2

240. An educational program will only be effective if it is professionally produced, interactive and presented in multiple languages. Material should be produced that can be used in many member countries.

RECOMMENDATION NO 3

241. The core of the training material should be professionally made videotape aimed at deterring gambling and corruption. The ATP in conjunction with the ITF should commission a professionally made video to be shown to mandatory player training sessions. Such a video would be strengthened by the inclusion of disgraced athletes in other sports that can relay their experiences to deter others.

RECOMMENDATION NO 4

242. As well as raising awareness of the problem, the program should encourage the reporting of improper approaches and demonstrate without ambiguity the resolve of the ATP to confront the problem. The video should be reinforced and supported by posters and other supporting material.

RECOMMENDATION NO 5

243. The training and awareness program should target all international players, player support team members, umpires and other relevant members of the tennis family. It should include all ranked players from juniors to seasoned professionals.

SECURITY AND CONTROL

244. Potential corruptors have gained access to players and others with ease. The absence of even the most basic background checks at many tournaments has allowed undesirable people to mix freely with players and has provided a breeding ground for improper

approaches and possible corruption and an avenue for player support teams to profit from their knowledge of inside injury information. The report sets out below a package of measures designed to incorporate best practice and promote a common sense approach to security and control.

RECOMMENDATION NO 6

245. The ATP should appoint a full time Security Manager with the following job description:

- Providing advice and action in relation to the security of players, officials and venues.
- Preventing and detecting improper approaches to players on tour.
- Collating intelligence about improper approaches and conducting investigations into allegations of corruption.

246. The Security Manager should have experience in the field of police investigations, security and anti-corruption. A background in police, military or security services would be a minimum requirement.

247. The Security Manager should enjoy independence within the ATP and should be accountable to the CEO only and not to individuals that act on behalf of the same persons that may be subject to investigation.

RECOMMENDATION NO 7

248. The ATP should implement standards of access formalized through a common accreditation platform. The ease by which persons with an interest in gambling gain accreditations to tournaments must be stopped. If this practice is allowed to continue the efforts to prevent corruption will undoubtedly fail.

249. While consultation is required with tournament members on finding a common sense workable solution, the recommendation is that credentialed access to ATP tournaments be by use of a common accreditation platform (system). Only those with a genuine business reason for credentials would be authorized to have credentials including players, agents, trainers, coaches, staff and media. The system would maintain full photographic record of those with credentials and those that authorized their credential and would cross reference a watch list of undesirable persons before any credential is approved. Player guests would be provided with tickets in place of accreditations. Persons with known links to gambling should be refused accreditations at all times.

250. Player support personnel, with their open access to locker rooms, present an integrity threat to tennis by their knowledge of inside injury information on other players. The player locker room should have access restricted to competing players and ATP trainers only. Private trainers, private coaches and other support team members should be barred from accessing the locker room, to minimize the opportunity for inside injury information to be traded by unscrupulous interests. It is noted by the inquiry the long standing WTA Tour practice that player coaches, and player trainers do not have access to the ladies competitor locker room and that such a practice is well accepted by all parties.

RECOMMENDATION NO 8

251. Entities with significant interests in gambling should be barred from ownership of ATP sanctioned tournaments. It is a conflict of interest and a threat to the integrity of tennis to have gambling interests owning and operating ATP tournaments.

MAKE EVERY MATCH COUNT

252. A root cause of corruption is deliberate underperformance. The ATP must *urgently* overhaul its rules to return to a system of reward for performance.

RECOMMENDATION NO 9

253. The ATP should overhaul its ranking system to ensure that a loss in any first round match results in a negative ranking impact for the losing players. Loss of ranking is seen as the major deterrent to deliberate underperformance by players.

RECOMMENDATION NO 10

254. Prize money at ATP tournaments and Challengers should be redistributed or boosted to reduce the threat of corruption. The ATP should consider distributing the current total prize money pool among fewer players and in so doing ensure that those players can earn a living wage that need not be supplemented by gambling or corruption.

RECOMMENDATION NO 11

255. The Challenger circuit calendar and rules need updating. With large scale betting now taking place on these small events, boosting prize money levels and scheduling them in the weeks of ATP events will reduce the risk of corruption. “Off-season” challenger events should be upgraded to ATP events, with the existing limitations on top 50 participation kept in place, with a boost in prize money and security acting to deter would be corruptors.

RECOMMENDATION NO 12

256. The ATP should seek to improve the levels of remuneration received by player coaches in an effort to reduce the seduction of gambling to this core component of the tennis family. The ATP could consider employing a team of traveling coaches on the ATP payroll to assist players with the development of their game at tournaments.

RECOMMENDATION NO 13

257. The Lucky Loser system is a major target of corruption and requires overhauling. It is recommended that the Lucky Loser selection be based on a random draw versus the current method of highest ranked. A random draw will remove the opportunity to manipulate the result of final round qualifying matches for mutual advantage.

RECOMMENDATION NO 14

258. The granting of releases to players that lose to compete in Special Events in the same week as an ATP event should be abolished. Having multiple opportunities to compete in a week is a root cause of underperformance and corruption. Players should commit to their choice of a single event per week and not be released to play in other events in the event of a loss.

RECOMMENDATION NO 15

259. The imposition of monetary fines for late withdrawals should be replaced by a non-monetary ranking penalty. A system is required that creates an incentive for players to complete their commitments but not a loophole that allows players to recover a financial penalty through unscrupulous means. A ranking penalty for a late withdrawal is just such a non-recoverable penalty.

ATP STAFF (Umpires, Trainers and Tour Managers)

260. As demonstrated by the Hoyzer example in German football, umpires have a direct ability to influence the outcomes of matches. Trainers and Tour Managers possess intimate knowledge of player injuries which is priceless inside information for would be gamblers. Both groups can be the targets of corruptors.

RECOMMENDATION NO 16

261. Umpires, trainer and Tour Managers working on the ATP Tour average annual incomes between 30,000 and 50,000 Euro. This low level of remuneration makes such staff possible targets for corruption. It is recommended that the ATP address the issue of umpire, trainer and Tour Manager incentives through structured rewards and job satisfaction initiatives to reduce the risk of corruption.

ROLE OF THE ATP BOARD

262. The ATP Board plays a critical role in showing leadership in the fight against corruption in tennis. The culture of gambling, underperformance and ensuing corruption that exists in tennis today must be confronted head on, unambiguously, transparently and resolutely by an apolitical ATP Board.

RECOMMENDATION NO 17

263. The ATP must accept that anti corruption and security measures are a necessary and long-term requirement to be funded by the ATP.

RECOMMENDATION NO 18

264. The ATP must address the 'conflict of interest' issue for those who serve on the ATP Board. An enforceable "*Code For Directors*" should be applied to elected Board members and senior executives of the ATP. The Code should include a signed declaration that the individual has at no time been involved in gambling on men's professional tennis, and that they will act immediately to report to the Security Manager any suspicion of gambling or corrupt conduct by player or tournament members or any other individual that may impact on the integrity of tennis.

265. Signing the "*Code for Directors*" must be a non-negotiable requirement for appointment as Board member or senior executive of the ATP.

RECOMMENDATION NO 19

266. The role of the Security Manager must be enshrined in its independence from those that represent the interests of persons that may be subject to anti-corruption inquiries.

REPORTING OF CORRUPTION

267. A culture exists amongst players and their support personnel that act to protect the corrupt behaviour of others. If any serious progress is to be made in fighting corruption in tennis this culture needs to be addressed.

RECOMMENDATION NO 20

268. The ATP rules should contain a positive requirement on players and tournaments to report suspicions of corruption to the Security Manager. A system should be developed that provides players, their support teams and other members of the tennis family with a means to anonymously submit their suspicions about gambling and corruption to the Security Officer.

269. The ATP must introduce an online system where individuals can report their suspicions about corruption in an anonymous manner if so desired. The system needs to be promoted to players and support team members.

IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

270. Men's professional tennis is at a crossroads of credibility that can only be resolved with a resolute commitment from the players, their support teams and their elected leadership to eradicate underperformance, corruption and corrupt individuals from the game. The report encourages the ATP to build on recent developments and implement the program of change set out in the recommendations in this report.

RICHARD INGS
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
ATP Inc.

Appendix 1

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APPENDIX 3

Betting odds conversion table.

Odds Conversion Chart		
Fractional	Decimal	American
10/1	11.00	\$1,000.00
9/1	10.00	\$900.00
17/2	9.50	\$850.00
8/1	9.00	\$800.00
15/2	8.50	\$750.00
7/1	8.00	\$700.00
13/2	7.50	\$650.00
6/1	7.00	\$600.00
11/2	6.50	\$550.00
5/1	6.00	\$500.00
9/2	5.50	\$450.00
4/1	5.00	\$400.00
18/5	4.60	\$360.00
7/2	4.50	\$350.00
100/30	4.333	\$333.33
16/5	4.20	\$320.00
3/1	4.00	\$300.00
14/5	3.80	\$280.00
11/4	3.75	\$275.00
13/5	3.60	\$260.00
5/2	3.50	\$250.00
12/5	3.40	\$240.00
95/40	3.375	\$237.50
23/10	3.30	\$230.00
9/4	3.25	\$225.00
11/5	3.20	\$220.00
85/40	3.125	\$212.50
21/10	3.10	\$210.00
2/1	3.00	\$200.00
19/10	2.90	\$190.00
15/8	2.875	\$187.50
9/5	2.80	\$180.00
7/4	2.75	\$175.00
17/10	2.70	\$170.00

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13/8	2.625	\$162.50
8/5	2.60	\$160.00
6/4	2.50	\$150.00
7/5	2.40	\$140.00
11/8	2.375	\$137.50
13/10	2.30	\$130.00
5/4	2.25	\$125.00
6/5	2.20	\$120.00
11/10	2.10	\$110.00
21/20	2.05	\$105.00
1/1	2.00	-\$100.00
20/21	1.952	-\$105.00
10/11	1.909	-\$110.00
9/10	1.90	-\$111.10
5/6	1.833	-\$120.00
4/5	1.80	-\$125.00
8/11	1.727	-\$137.50
7/10	1.70	-\$142.90
4/6	1.667	-\$150.00
5/8	1.625	-\$160.00
8/13	1.615	-\$162.50
3/5	1.60	-\$166.70
4/7	1.571	-\$175.00
8/15	1.533	-\$187.50
1/2	1.50	-\$200.00
40/85	1.471	-\$212.50
9/20	1.45	-\$222.20
4/9	1.444	-\$22500
2/5	1.40	-\$250.00
4/11	1.364	-\$275.00
7/20	1.35	-\$285.70
1/3	1.333	-\$300.00
30/100	1.30	-\$333.30
2/7	1.286	-\$350.00
1/4	1.25	-\$400.00
2/9	1.222	-\$450.00
1/5	1.20	-\$500.00

